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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Synopsis
On June 28, 2012 the custom home of David and Kristina Parks on Autumn
Lane, in Pocatello, was totally destroyed by the “Charlotte Fire” that also destroyed 65
other homes.  CR 671, 673; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7.   The Parks’ base coverage under their
Safeco “Replacement” policy was $371,900.  CR 258-259, 262, 264; David Parks Depo.
Ex. 2, POL 2-3, 6, 8; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2. An “Extended Dwelling Coverage” rider
increased that base coverage by an additional 25% to $464,875.  CR 263, 270; David Parks
Depo. Ex. 2, POL 7 & 14 “Extended Dwelling Coverage”; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2.  The base value
of $371,900 was determined by Safeco, incidental to an annual review process, that
increased premium and policy renewal just six weeks prior to the May 27  renewal date. th
CR 258-259; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 2-3; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2. 
Safeco refused to pay the Parks the $371,900 insured amount contending
essentially that the Parks’ insurance policy was only an indemnity policy that the Parks
first had to borrow or buy — out of their own pocket — another home that, even if much
smaller and lesser quality, would still set the upper limit of Safeco’s obligation.    
Safeco tendered a check for $169,000 contending that was the fair market
value of their Autumn Lane home as determined by appraiser Robert Jones.  CR 371-393;
David Parks Depo. Ex. 13 & 14.  That lead to seeking legal counsel who, ultimately, got
Safeco to commit that the Parks could negotiate the lowball $169,000 check without
prejudice to their coverage rights.  CR 399-435; David Parks Depo. Ex. 20 & 21.  
  That was the portion of the purchase price allocated to the home; the land was $45,000.1
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Safeco then retained Belfor Property Restoration of Boise to make a
thorough assessment of the replacement cost/value of the Parks home.  Belfor determined
that amount to be $440,195.55 (exclusive of land) or $90.60 per square foot for the
computed 4,858.28 total square feet.  CR 428-429; David Parks Depo. Ex. 21, pp. 25-26.  
Counsel for the Parks made demand for that $440,195.55 pursuant to the
Safeco policy entitling the Parks to their “direct financial loss” subject only to the limits
of coverage.  CR 444-445; David Parks Depo. Ex. 27.
Safeco denied payment, contending no obligation to pay until the Parks had
incurred the additional expense of another home — though the “direct financial loss”
policy provision did not require such.  CR 446-447; David Parks Depo. Ex. 28.  Five
months later the Parks borrowed money to buy a smaller home in Idaho Falls for
$255,000.   CR 459-485; David Parks Depo. Ex. 35. 1
The court granted summary judgment for Safeco following a policy payout
procedure that was not the policy the Parks had.  The court essentially ruled that the
Parks’ “New Quality-Plus Policy” policy was only an indemnity policy immunizing
Safeco from making payment until the Parks had borrowed money to buy a new home. 
The court came to that result by starting with the definition of “replace” despite
acknowledging “replace” more commonly meant “the equivalent of” rather than “in place
of” which did not focus on value.  CR 1063-1064; Memo. Decision, pp. 10-11 (4-23-15). 
  The Parks challenged the unfairness of this by comparing it to a policyholder insuring, and2
paying the premium, to insure, an expensive Mercedes, but only purchasing a cheaper Chevrolet after
Safeco refused to first pay the insured loss.  Safeco’s adjuster never responded to that comparison.   CR
459-460 and 654-669; David Parks Depo. Ex. 35 and Safeco Depo. Ex. 6.
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The District Court held that the word “incur” or “incurred” in the Safeco
policy could only refer to incurring a debt or expense while totally ignoring the more
common usage — in the insurance context — of “incurring a loss” as happened when the
Parks’ home burned to the ground.  CR 1064-1065; Memo. Decision, pp. 11-12 (4-23-15).
Nature of the Case
This is an insurance “total” residential fire loss claim under the Plaintiffs
David and Kristina Parks’ “New Quality-Plus Policy” with Safeco.
Course of Proceedings
After the party depositions, but hearing Plaintiffs’ prior-filed Motion to
compel discovery from Safeco for withheld discovery, Safeco filed for Summary
Judgment.  The court ultimately ordered the discovery produced, granted a Rule 56(f)
extension of time, and heard cross motions for summary judgment.  The District Court
granted summary judgment for Safeco, holding (1) There was no obligation to pay the
Parks the total loss of their home until the Parks had first borrowed the money to buy
another home, and (2) Safeco had no obligation to pay the Parks the $371,900 amount
they had insured their home for on Safeco’s specific recommendation, but that Safeco was
not obligated to pay more than what the Parks had “incurred” to buy a smaller home in
Idaho Falls for $255,000.    CR 1054-1072, Memorandum Decision (4-23-15).  2
  Named after the street where the fire started.3
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Plaintiffs then filed this Appeal.  CR 1075-1081.   
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 28, 2012 a fire in the west hills of Pocatello, called the “Charlotte
Fire”,  totally destroyed the homes of 66 families.  Plaintiffs’ David and Kristina Parks’3
home on Autumn Lane was one of the 66.  CR 673; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7, p. 4.
The Parks home was a “custom design and custom built home.”  CR 529;
Kristina Parks Depo. 30:19-20.  The Autumn Lane area was “above average in condition
and appeal and at the upper end of the value scale for the city” and had “above average
views” of the Portneuf Gap Area.  CR 671; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7, p. 2.
The Parks had been insureds of Safeco since at least May of 1994.  Each
year around mid-April, about six weeks before the May 27  renewal date of theirth
homeowners policy, Safeco wrote the Parks recommending increased coverage at an
increased premium.  Typically, those Safeco letters advised that policy coverages were
being increased “based on careful assessment of your home’s replacement value” and
stating what the new “careful assessment” replacement value would be upon renewal. 
CR 654-669; Safeco Depo. Ex. 6.
“New Quality-Plus Policy”
Those Safeco-recommended yearly increases brought the Parks’ home base
insured value to $371,900 as of the June 28, 2012 fire.  CR 258-259, 262, 264; David
  Those Safeco-recommended annual increased valuations are represented in the Safeco policy4
to be the result of, among others, information Safeco had on “your dwelling’s features” and “Labor and
material cost trends for your area supplied to us by recognized residential construction cost specialists”
with payment of the premium indicating “acceptance of the new amount.”  CR 616; Safeco Depo. POL
27.
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Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 2-3, 6, 8.  The 2012 renewal policy was labeled a “Safeco New
Quality-Plus” policy.  CR 266; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 10.  That policy had
“Extended Dwelling Coverage” that increased the Parks’ coverage by 25% because the
Parks had accepted the yearly increased recommended valuation and paid the increased
premium.   CR 265, 270, 301; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 9, 14, 45; CR 549-550;4
Safeco Depo. 29:5-30:21.   That brought their home coverage to $464,875 ($371,900 x
1.25) as of May 27, 2012 (the renewal date) and just a month before the June 28, 2012
“Charlotte fire.”  CR 258-259, 262, 264; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 2-3, 6, 8; Safeco
Depo. Ex. 2.  This is how the Safeco-recommended annual increased valuations
progressed from 1994 to 2012:
Safeco Renewal/Increased Valuation Letters
Safeco letter Old Value New Base Coverage
April 20, 1994 $172,000 $177,000
April 17, 1995 $177,000 $195,000
April 17, 1996 $195,000 $198,000
April 17, 1997 $198,000 $203,000
April 19, 1998 $203,000 $210,000
* * *  [1999]
April 17, 2000 $212,000 $218,000
* * * [2001] $218,000 $221,000 Declarations page 
April 17, 2002 $221,000 $223,000
* * *   [2003]
April 18, 2004 $299,000 $310,000
  That $371,900 base coverage on the Parks “Dwelling” was only a lowest limit base coverage as5
the policy provided “an additional 25% or an additional 50% of your dwelling limit.”  CR 606, 609-610;
Safeco Depo. Ex. 2, pp. POL 7, 8 and 14 “Extended Dwelling Coverage”.  The Parks thus had
“Dwelling” coverage of $371,900 plus the stated additional 25% to 50% or total dwelling coverage of up
to $557,850.  This extra coverage of “at least 25%” is admitted.  CR 549-550; Safeco Depo. 29:5-
30:21. 
  That letter is actually considered to be a part of the policy as stated on the cover page Affidavit6
of Patricia Ouellette, the Safeco Archivist who provided the copy of the policy.  Safeco defense counsel
answered the Complaint stating Safeco was “unaware of any such” letter.  CR 616; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2,
POL 27, Section I — “Property Conditions” ¶ 2.
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April 17, 2005 $310,000 $326,000
April 17, 2006 $326,000 $332,000
* * *  [2007] $332,000
* * *  [2008]
May 27,2009 $ $361,900 Declarations 4-19-2009
May 27, 2010 $ $361,900 Declarations 4-18-2010
* * *   [2011] $361,900 $368,200 * * *
April 17, 2012 $368,200 $371,900 [Fire was 6-28-12]5
— CR 654-669; Safeco Depo. Ex. 6.
Groundless Denials
Safeco counsel, in the Amended Answer to the Complaint, asserted Safeco
was “unaware of any such letter” .  But in the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, Safeco’s6
designated representative had to admit those letters were, indeed, well known to Safeco:
Q.   Okay.  You know that Safeco routinely sent out letters
incidental to renewals coming up?
A.   Yes.
Q.   What would it have taken for you to have produced these
letters in response to our request in terms of where Safeco
keeps them?
A.   This would have been a request from our underwriting
department.
Q.   Okay.  And they would have those?
A.   Yes.  
— CR 546; Safeco Depo. 14:4-13
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Lowball Payment Disregarding the Insured “Replacement Cost”
Despite those 18+ years of dealing and the Safeco-recommended coverage
increase to $371,900 just before the fire, about a month after the fire, Safeco sent
Plaintiffs a check for only $169,000 with a notation on it  “In Payment of: Cov[erage] A –
Dwelling – Market Value”.  CR 400; David Parks Depo. Ex. 20, p. 2, Check No.
8004530 (7-26-12).  Less than half of what their base coverage was.   
The $169,000 payment was based on an appraisal by Robert Jones of
Pocatello who had been retained by Safeco, but “shorted” the true value by only valuing
1,943 square feet — less than half of the home’s actual 4,858.28 total square feet. CR
705; Safeco Depo. Ex. 8, p. 25 “Grand Total Areas”; CR 554-555; Safeco Depo. 49:23-
50:3.  
Further, that Jones appraisal used two-year old 2010 “comparables” rather
than 2012 values and took those “comparables” from three of six other “tract” houses
rather than the more exclusive area of Autumn Lane where the Parks lived. — CR 673; 
Safeco Depo. Ex. 7.  Safeco admitted that was wrong.  CR 563; Safeco Depo. 85:13-19.
Six “Comparable” homes — Averaging $118.45 and $128.21 per square foot
The Jones appraisal created a table for three “comparable” out-of-area
homes with square footage values of  $107.94 and $129.07, and $118.36  — an average
of $118.45.  The appraisal, however, had pictures and data of three other “comparable”
homes that were appraised at square footage values of $106.59 and $122.17 and $155.86
PLAINTIFFS’ APPEAL BRIEF — Page 11
       David & Kristina Parks v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois
— an average of $128.21.  CR 670-690, 546, 561-563; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7; 14:18 and
77:18-85:16.
The Parks disagreed with the low Jones appraisal. CR 553; Safeco Depo.
44:19-45:5; CR 227 and 232; David Parks Depo. 90:4-16 and 112:1-113:23; CR 528-529;
Kristina Parks Depo. 29:24-30:25.  Because of the $169,000 check notation “In Payment
of: Cov[erage] A – Dwelling – Market Value” was for less than half of their $371,900
base coverage, the Parks did not cash the check but sought legal counsel on August 30,
2012.  Plaintiffs’ counsel sought Safeco’s affirmative statement that the Parks could
negotiate that check without prejudice to any of their insurance rights. CR 399; David
Parks Depo. Ex. 20, p. 1.  Three weeks later, on September 20, 2012, Safeco finally gave
the Parks written assurance that the $169,000 check could be negotiated without
prejudice. CR 401-402; David Parks Depo. Ex. 21.
Belfor Property Restoration Appraisal — $90.60/square foot
After that lowball Jones appraisal, and prior to September 20, 2012, Safeco
retained Belfor Property Restoration of Boise, Idaho to determine the true  reconstruction
replacement cost of the Parks’ residence using “equivalent construction.”  Belfor Property
Restoration determined the Parks home to have been 4,858.28 square feet and the
replacement cost with comparable materials to be $440,195.55 exclusive of land —
$90.60 per square foot. CR 705; Safeco Depo. Ex. 8, p. 25 “Grand Total Areas”; CR 
554-555; Safeco Depo. 49:23-50:3.
  It is significant that the policy uses the term “Loss Settlement” rather than “Indemnity”7
settlement.
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No Insurance until the Parks Incurred Debt??
Despite the gross tactical undervaluing of the Parks home by Safeco
through the Jones appraisal and the comprehensive accurate and thorough evaluation of
the Parks loss by Belfor Property Restoration, Safeco still did not pay the Parks for their
actual loss.  
Safeco’s position was that, notwithstanding the insured value on the home, 
Safeco’s annual letter increasing coverage to $371,900, and the Belfor Property
Restoration detailed and accurate appraisal, the Parks could not receive the full insured
value because they bought a less expensive home in Idaho Falls and Safeco had no
obligation to pay until the Parks had “incurred” the debt of another home. CR 442-443;
David Parks Depo. Ex. 26.
Stated otherwise, Safeco contended the Parks did not have an insurance
policy but only an indemnity policy requiring them to first “foot” the loss they had
incurred and then ask for reimbursement.
The Policy “Loss Settlement”Provisions
That position of Safeco was wrong.  The Parks’ Safeco policy is not an
indemnity policy but provides for “Loss Settlement” and not “debt incurred settlement.”  
Two “Loss Settlement” Options
Under the “Loss Settlement”  provisions of the policy there are two7
  If “Extended Dwelling Coverage” rights are exercised the damaged house must be rebuilt, but8
that requirement is specifically limited to the bonus 25% coverage and does not apply to the base insured
coverage of $371,900.  Nor were insureds required to rebuild or even purchase another house in order to
be paid their “direct financial loss you incur” subject only to not exceeding policy limits.
  A third “smallest of” factor dealt with “our prorata share” among insurance policies if there9
were more than one, but there was not, so the third option did not apply.  CR 284; David Parks Depo.
Ex. 2, POL 28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2.
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different settlement options.  Neither makes a blanket requirement that the Parks borrow
money to buy a different house before being compensated for their insured loss.8
The first option, is the process the District Court went through — albeit
erroneously — that limited the Parks recovery to the cost of the smaller Idaho Falls house
that the Parks borrowed money to purchase.  The second option has a more simple
process; it provides for payment of “the smallest of” policy limits or “the direct financial
loss you incur.”   CR 284; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2.9
The District Court totally ignored the “Direct financial loss” Option
In granting summary judgment to Safeco, the District Court erred by
ignoring the second option — “direct financial loss” — though the District Court
recognized that process as being in the policy.  CR 284; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL
28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2; CR 1054-1072, Memorandum Decision (4-23-15).
Admitted Non-delegable Duty of Good Faith & Fair Dealing
All of this occurred in the context of Safeco admitting in its Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition that it had a duty of good faith and fair dealing with the Parks that did not end
just because a coverage or payment lawsuit is filed:
  Despite Safeco’s known fiduciary duty to the Parks, Safeco gave no guidelines to Mr. Jones10
incidental to his providing the low-ball appraisal.  CR 552; Safeco Depo 38:3-8.  Mrs. Abendschein
testified she had asked Mr. Jones to give Safeco “current 2012 values” of the Parks’ home “the day
before the fire” and not 2010 values that Jones used and Safeco was content with.  CR 563; Safeco
Depo 85:13-19.
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Q.   Do you realize that the duty of good faith and fair dealing
does not end with the filing of a lawsuit or policy coverage or
resolution?
MR. ANDERSON:  Calls for a legal conclusion.
THE WITNESS:  I do.
— CR 549; Safeco Depo. 26:1-24
Similarly, Safeco admitted it could not escape its duty of good faith and fair
dealing by distancing itself from the lowball $169,000 check sent to the Parks because it
was based on the low appraisal  of Robert Jones — a non-Safeco employee — that10
Safeco hired.  CR 670-690; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7. 
Q.   That Safeco cannot excuse a failure to deal in good faith
and with fair dealing by virtue of the conduct of somebody
they retain; do you understand that?
A.   Yes.
— CR 566; Safeco Depo. 96:2-96:5
* * *
Q.   Do you understand that Safeco’s duty of good faith and
fair dealing is a nondelegable duty?
MR. ANDERSON:  Object to the form.
BY MR. HAWKES:
Q.   Do you know what that means?
A.   Yes.
Q.   Okay.
A.   That's the answer.  Yes.
Q.   That Safeco cannot excuse a failure to deal in good faith
and with fair dealing by virtue of the conduct of somebody
they retain; do you understand that?
A.   Yes.
— CR 566; Safeco Depo. 95:19-96:5
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The Appraisal was less than half the house
The Parks’ home was a two-level, custom upgraded, home in an exclusive
area with a sloping view lot of the Portneuf Gap and with a full “Daylight” walkout above
grade on the lower level.  CR 529; Kristina Parks Depo 30:19-21; cr 232; David Parks
Depo. 112:24-113:1; CR 671; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7.
In fact, it was undisputably determined to be 4,858.28 square feet with an
upper main west entrance level and a lower east entrance level that exited through
separate sliding glass view doors to an easterly view of the “Portneuf Gap” and
mountains.  CR 671; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7 (Jones appraisal); CR 694-695; Safeco Depo.
Ex. 8, p. 3, l. 23 (Belfor itemized estimate); CR 529; Kristina Parks Depo 30:16-21; CR
232; David Parks Depo. 112:24-113:1.
Admitted Square Footage Was 4,858.28
Further, the correct square footage of the Parks’ home — as set forth in the
Safeco’s own retained expert, Belfor Property Restoration itemization — was admitted in
the Safeco deposition to be 4,858.28 square feet. CR 705; Safeco Depo. Ex. 8, p. 25
“Grand Total Areas”; CR 554-555; Safeco Depo. 49:23-50:3.
Non-comparable “Comparables”
In addition, the Jones lowball appraisal used out-of-area “comparables” that
were not “comparable.”  That was easily discernable to Safeco as it recited that the area
of the Charlotte fire differed from the recited “comparables” because the Parks home was 
“above average in condition and appeal at the upper end of the value scale for the city.” 
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CR 671; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7, p. 1.  The “comparables were also “tract homes” rather than
custom homes like the Parks’ home was. CR 529; Kristina Parks Depo 30:16-25.
Appraisal used Old Data
Further, Jones’ lowball appraisal used 2010 values rather than appropriate
and current 2012 values that Safeco had specifically written the Parks about to increase
their coverage to current levels.  CR 673; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7, p. 4.
Self-imposed Ignorance
Though those key deficiencies were shown in the Jones lowball appraisal
and thus “there for the looking,” Safeco’s designated Rule 30(b)(6) representative and
primary insurance adjuster with the Parks admitted that she was not aware of these
serious deficiencies.  CR 552; Safeco Depo. 38:20-39:14.
Q.   ...You knew that the Parks had a home that was two levels
and was a full walkout basement; right?
A.   Yes.
Q.   Do you think in appraisal the value of that house it was
fair to compare their fair market value by houses in which he
only considered the above-grade square footage?
MR. ANDERSON:  Object to the form.  Lack of foundation
and assumes facts.
THE WITNESS:  I don’t direct or provide any guidelines for
the appraisal, so – 
BY MR. HAWKES:
Q.   You had to decide whether to accept that appraisal; correct?
A.   Correct.
Q.   That was your judgment call?
A.   We requested that and we accepted it.
Q.   Okay.  Who was the “we”?
A.   Safeco.  
— CR 552, Safeco Depo. 39:19-40:12
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Corrected Appraisal Values from “Comparables” = $575,463.26 
The per square foot market value that Jones put on the 3 “comparable”
homes in his appraisal were $107.94 and $129.07 and $118.36 for an average of $118.45
per square foot.  Applied against the admitted 4,858.28 square footage, Safeco accepted
in Safeco’s own retained expert Belfor Property Restoration’s assessment that the
average value of the Parks home was $575,463.26.  CR 672, 705; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7, p.
3; Safeco Depo. Ex. 8, p. 25.
PLAINTIFFS’ ISSUES ON APPEAL
(a) The District Court erred in not considering the “Direct financial
loss” provision of the Safeco policy that entitled the Parks to early
payment.
(b) The District Court erred in holding that Safeco had no duty to pay
the Parks for the total fire loss of their home until the Parks had first
borrowed money to buy a smaller home.
(c) The District Court erred in holding that the smaller home in Idaho
Falls that the Parks borrowed money to purchase for $255,000 was
“the equivalent” of the home Safeco had advised the Parks shortly
before the fire needed to be insured for no less than $371,900.
(d) The District Court erred in ignoring material facts that precluded
summary judgment for Safeco and were relevant to insurance
industry practices and standardized policies.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Attorney Fees are sought pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839(1).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, the Supreme
Court reviews that decision de novo while applying the same Rule 56 standards. Carnell
v. Barker Management, Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 326, 48 P.3d 651 (2002); McColm-Traska
v. Valley View, Inc., 138 Idaho 497, 500, 65 P.3d 519 (2003);  Cascade Auto Glass,
Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 662, 115 P.3d 751, 753 (2005).  
Insurance contracts must be construed according to the entirety and the
context in which terms occur.  Idaho Code §41-1822; Dave's Inc. v. Linford, 153 Idaho
744, 751, 291 P.3d 427 (2012); North Pac. Ins. Co. v. Mai, 130 Idaho 251, 254-55; 939
P.2d 570 (1997); Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Id., 138 Idaho 443, 444, 65 P.3d 184
(2003);Weinstein v. Prudential Ins., 149 Idaho 299, 315, 233 P.3d 1221, (2010).
 In interpreting an insurance policy, the Court construes insurance contracts
in a light most favorable to the insured and in a manner which will provide full coverage
for the indicated risks rather than to narrow its protection.”  Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v.
Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 662-663, 115 P.3d 751 (2005).
Because insurance policies are not subject to negotiation between the
parties, ambiguities must be construed most strongly against the insurer. The burden is on
the insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to restrict the scope of coverage;
exclusions or provisions not stated with specificity will not be presumed or inferred. 
Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242 (2003).
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE PARKS WERE ENTITLED TO THEIR
“DIRECT FINANCIAL LOSS” THAT WAS AT LEAST
EQUAL TO THE BELFOR DETERMINATION OF $440,195.55
Two “Loss Settlement” Payment Options
Under the Parks’ Safeco policy there were two “Loss Settlement” processes
for the Parks to get paid.  The first was to determine “the smallest” dollar amount
between five considerations — subparagraphs (a) through (e) as set forth in the box
below:
— CR 284; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2, (¶ 5.a.(1-3)).
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The second “Loss Settlement” process available to the Parks provided “you
may disregard” the first process in the paragraphs above and recover the “direct financial
loss you incur” as alternatively provided in the “Loss Settlement” provisions in the policy. 
The second process was not subject to any “smallest of” other events, except the limits of
coverage, or Safeco’s prorata liability if the loss was covered by more than one policy. 
— CR 284; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2, (¶ 5.a.(4)).
That first option was erroneously utilized, and otherwise treated, by the
District Court as the exclusive method for the Parks to get paid under their Safeco policy;
it was not the exclusive process to get paid.  CR 284; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 28;
Safeco Depo. Ex. 2; ¶  5. a (1) through (3), p. 12.
4,858.28 Square Feet at $90.60/square foot = $440,195.55
That Belfor Property Restoration evaluation determined that there were
4,858.28 total square feet in the Parks’ Autumn Lane home.  It further determined that the
replacement cost was $440,195.55 for those 4,858.28 square feet.  That equaled —
$90.60 per square foot. CR 705; Safeco Depo. Ex. 8, “Grand Total Areas” p. 25, CR 554-
  The above stated Jones appraisal “Comps # 1 ($107.94/sq. ft.) and 2 ($129.07/sq. ft.) were11
judged the most representative and similar overall.”  CR 672; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7, p. 3 under
“Summary of Sales Comparison Approach.” 
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555; Safeco Depo. 49:23-50:3. 
That square foot determination value of $90.60 by Belfor Property
Restoration for the Parks’ home with 4,858.28 square feet of floor space contrasted with
the nine “Comparables” in the Jones appraisal where the fair market value averaged
$122.03 per square foot:
“Comparable” Homes Square Foot Value
No. 1 $107.9411
No. 2 $129.07
No. 3 $118.60
No. 4 $155.86
No. 5 $122.17
No. 6 $106.59
No. 7 $103.03
No. 8 $134.84
No. 9 $120.14
Total $1,098.24 divided by 9 = $122.03
— CR 672, 677-678; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7, Jones Appraisal.
Applying that average $122.03 per square foot, for all nine “Comparables”
to the admitted 4,858.28 square footage of the Parks home as accepted by Safeco from
the Belfor Property Restoration determination, the average value of the Parks home
would be $592,855.91. CR 672; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7, p. 3; CR 705; Safeco Depo. Ex. 8,
p. 25. 
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Proof of minimum loss because lowest square foot valuation
Thus, it was beyond reasonable dispute that the Parks’ direct financial loss
was at least equal to the Belfor Property Restoration value of  $440,195.55 assessment; it
was the lowest square foot valuation of the Parks’ home when compared to the nine
“Comparables” in the Jones appraisal. 
Safeco agrees to be bound by the Belfor values 
On October 17, 2012 Safeco was asked if it was “willing to be bound by”
the “amounts, breakdown, and unit pricing” of the Belfor determination. CR 436; David
Parks Depo. Ex. 22.  It took Safeco five weeks to finally give notice to the Parks.  On
November 24, 2012 Safeco had “approved” the Belfor computations.  CR 438-439; David
Parks Depo. Ex. 23.  Safeco reaffirmed, on December 20, 2012, that it had “approved”
the Belfor computations and was willing to be bound by those determinations.  CR 442-
443; David Parks Depo. Ex. 26.
Formal Demand for “Direct financial Loss”
Because the Jones appraisal acknowledged that the Parks’ home was  in a
higher value area where homes were “above average in condition and appeal at the upper
end of the value scale for the city” — as contrasted with the “Comparables” he used —
and that market value was greater than replacement value, it was not fairly debatable that
using the Belfor Property Restoration value of $440,195.55 was the Parks’ minimum
“direct financial loss.” CR 671-673; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7 (Jones Appraisal); CR 705-707;
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Safeco Depo. Ex. 8 (Belfor itemized estimate).
Thus, on December 26, 2012 “formal demand” was made on Safeco for the
Belfor Property Restoration determination of $440,195.55 as the “direct financial loss” of
the Parks.  CR 444-445; David Parks Depo. Ex. 27.  Safeco’s response was to send two
letters totally omitting reference to the “direct financial loss you incur” provisions of the
second option provided in subparagraph (4) of the “Loss Settlement” clause, while
telling the Parks in both letters that the Parks had to pay their own loss before getting
reimbursed.  CR 446-447 and 450-452; Safeco Depo. Ex. 28 and 31 (letters December
27, 2012 and January 23, 2013).  
Suit was filed thereafter.
Safeco adheres in deposition to the Belfor computations and value
After suit was filed, a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Safeco was taken on
March 6, 2014.  In that deposition Safeco was given a further opportunity to back-off or
disavow the value determinations of Belfor Property Restoration.  Safeco’s
representative acknowledged its agreement with all of the  “numbers and computations”
contained in the Belfor Property Restoration determination.  CR 564; Safeco Depo.
89:17-22.   
Safeco’s failure to pay that minimum required policy amount was not only a
breach of contract, but an act of bad faith, and the District Court was in error to not grant
summary judgment to the Parks for their contractual loss at a minimum.
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POINT TWO
THE $255,000 IDAHO FALLS HOME WAS NOT 
“THE EQUIVALENT OF” THE PARKS 
TOTALLY DESTROYED HOME
THAT WOULD TAKE $440,195.55 TO  “REPLACE” 
In granting summary judgement for Safeco, the District looked exclusively
to just the first option of the “Loss Settlement” provisions in the Parks’ policy —
paragraphs 5. a (1) through (3) to determine “the smallest” dollar amount of a multiple
steps process.  CR 1060-1067, Memorandum Decision, pp. 7-14 (4-23-15); CR 284; David
Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2; ¶ 5. a (1) through (3), p. 12.
The District Court then held that the $255,000 smaller Idaho Falls home —
that the Parks had to borrow money to buy on December 6, 2012 — was “the equivalent
of” their totally-destroyed home.  It was undisputedly not “the equivalent” of what the
Parks lost; Safeco agreed it would cost $440,195.55 to replace the Parks’ home.  And the
Jones’ appraisal put market values above replacement cost.  CR 1060-1067,
Memorandum Decision, pp. 7-14 (4-23-15).
The District Court’s erroneous process started by addressing the words
“repair or replace the damaged building” in the policy for purposes of determining “the
smallest of” the four itemized categories.   CR 1060-1067, Memorandum Decision, pp. 7-
14 (4-23-15).
Plaintiffs’ position, as acknowledged by the District Court, was that
  All italics and bold herein are added unless stated otherwise.12
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“buying a home in Idaho Falls does not constitute repairing or replacing the home that
was totally lost under subsection (c)” because “the damaged building was not repaired or
replaced” when reading the language of the policy construed most favorably to the Parks. 
CR 1063; Memorandum Decision, p. 10 (4-23-15).
The court agreed that “repair” did not apply because the Parks’ “house was
completely destroyed in the fire.”  CR 1063; Memorandum Decision, p. 10 (4-23-15).  
The court then undertook to determine whether the “completely destroyed”
home was “replaced” under rules applicable to insurance policies.  CR 1063;
Memorandum Decision, p. 10 (4-23-15).  The Parks’ position was that the home was not
“replaced” by buying a smaller home in Idaho Falls because the Idaho Falls home did not
“restore” them to their “former condition”, or give them “the like”, as the term is most
commonly used and defined by Webster’s Dictionary.  CR 1063; Memorandum Decision,
p. 10 (4-23-15).  
The District Court then set forth the following definitions of “replace” from
Webster’s Dictionary:
1. To place again; to restore to a former place,  position,12
condition, or the like. 
2. To refund; to repay; to restore. 
3. To supply or substitute an equivalent for. 
4. To take the place of; to supply the want of. 
5. To put in a new or different place.
— CR 1063; Memorandum Decision, p. 10 (4-23-15).
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While it is true that the Idaho Falls home “took the place of” their former
home — just as a hotel room or a cheap apartment would have become their new abode
— it certainly was not the “equivalent for” or “the like” of their Pocatello home, nor did
it “restore” to the Parks what they had lost and paid Safeco a premium to get the
“equivalent” of.
Entitled to the “Equivalent” of what they lost
On the next half a page of his Memorandum Decision, the District Court
referred five times to the Parks being entitled to “an equivalent for” what they lost, while
stating that the five enumerated definitions by Webster’s of “replace” were “not in
conflict with one another.”  CR 1064; Memorandum Decision, p. 11 (4-23-15).  The
Court then, for the sixth time, stated that the Parks were entitled to the “equivalent” of
what they lost:
Within the context of the Replacement Cost provision, all
interpretations of “replace” as used in the Policy plainly
provide that Defendant has three options to “supply or
substitute an equivalent for” Plaintiffs' destroyed home.
— CR 1064; Memorandum Decision, p. 11 (4-23-15)
The District Court then essentially ignored what it had just concluded by
stating that the $255,000 the Parks paid for the Idaho Falls home was “the amount
actually incurred to repair or replace” the Parks’ Pocatello home.  CR 1066;
Memorandum Decision, p. 13 (4-23-15).
To the extent that there were competing definitions of “replace” for which
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the majority of the definitions meant “the equivalent of” or “the like” as contrasted with
the contrasting and minority definition of “To put in a new or different place” the District
Court erred in not holding that the Parks were entitled to “the equivalent” of what they
lost.  Further, the law is clear that when interpreting an insurance policy, the Court
construes insurance contracts in a light most favorable to the insured and in a manner
which will provide full coverage for the indicated risks rather than to narrow its
protection.”  Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660,
662-663, 115 P.3d 751 (2005).  Additionally, because insurance policies are contracts of
adhesion, not subject to negotiation between the parties, ambiguities must be construed
most strongly against the insurer. The burden is on the insurer to use clear and precise
language if it wishes to restrict the scope of coverage; exclusions or provisions not stated
with specificity will not be presumed or inferred.  Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242, 245 (2003).
The cheaper Idaho Falls home was not “the equivalent” of the Pocatello home
Additionally, the District Court jumped to that erroneous fact and legal
conclusion without ever addressing head-on the fact issue of whether the Idaho Falls
home was indeed “the equivalent” of the home the Parks lost.  It was not, and the District
Court erred in so concluding; $255,000 was not the “equivalent” of the $371,900.
Safeco’s renewal letter stated was the home replacement cost of $440,195.55 as
determined by Safeco through its chosen expert Belfor Property Restoration.  
  Separate correspondence can become part of the policy.  See, Farmers Insurance13
Company of Idaho v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428, 432, 987 P.2d 1043 (1999)(The district court
concluded that the ‘Dear Policyholder’ language was part of the UIM endorsement which conflicted with
the limitation of liability and setoff provisions, thus, making the endorsement ambiguous).
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Safeco never contended the cheaper Idaho Falls home was “the equivalent”
Further, Safeco never contended, in any of its communications or filings,
that the much cheaper Idaho Falls home was “the equivalent” of the Parks’ Pocatello
home that Safeco had advised should be insured for no less than $371,900 as of the June
28, 2012 fire.  POL 2-3, 6, 8.  That June 28  letter is part of the Safeco policy to theth
extent it contradicts the printed provisions of the policy.   See policy cover page affidavit13
of Patricia Ouellette, POL 1.  CR 257-259, 262, 264; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 1-3,
6, 8; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2. 
The District Court failed to follow the law in only looking at one portion of
the Safeco policy and requiring the Parks to first “pay their own loss” before receiving
any insurance payment.
POINT THREE
IT WAS ERROR TO NOT APPLY A DEFINITION OF “INCUR” 
THAT WAS REASONABLE AND MORE FAVORABLE
TO THE INSUREDS, THE PARKS
In granting summary judgment for Safeco, the District Court recognized
the correct rules that differing interpretations of language present questions of fact and,
as between policy language reasonably susceptible to different meanings, the definition
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and usage most favorable to the insured must be used:
Where the policy is reasonably subject to differing
interpretations, the language is ambiguous and its meaning is
a question of fact. Moss v. Mid-America Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 103 Idaho 298, 300, 647 P.2d 754, 756 (1982). 
— CR 1057-1058; Memorandum Decision, pp. 4-5 (4-23-15)
* * *
An insurance policy provision is ambiguous if “it is
reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations.” 
[referencing fn 18 and citing Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v.
Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d
751, 754 (2005)]
* * *
If a policy is found to be ambiguous, then its interpretation is
a question of fact and any ambiguities in the policy must be
construed against the insurer. [referencing fn 19 and citing
Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141
Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d 751, 754 (2005)]
— CR 1059; Memorandum Decision, pp. 6 (4-23-15)
However, the District Court failed to follow those basic rules which
resulted in the consequence or essentially writing-out of the Parks’ policy the very
essence of “insurance.”
The District Court ignores meaning of “Incurring a loss”
Further, the reversible error was in interpreting the word “incurred” to
exclusively mean to incur a debt or expense while ignoring the more common usage — in
the insurance context of — “to incur a loss.” 
Thus, using only the definition of “incurring a debt”, the Court held that the
Parks were required to “incur a debt or expense” in borrowing the money to buy another
  Additionally, Plaintiffs argue it is not a reasonable interpretation of the Policy that they14
were required to “incur” expenses to rebuild before receiving coverage.  CR 1059; Memorandum
Decision, p. 6 (4-23-15).
  Indeed, that is the only reasonable reading of the incurred requirement, because it would not15
likely be possible for the insured to actually pay the full repair estimate shortly following the loss; the
very purpose of insurance is to avoid that very thing.  Further, defining “incurred” as including a repair
estimate, such as the detailed one performed by Belfor Property Restoration, is consistent with the Safeco
policy definition of “Replacement cost.”  CR 950; Miller Declaration, ¶14.
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house before they were entitled to be paid anything under their Safeco insurance policy.  14
A policyholder cannot “incur a loss” ???
Safeco essentially persuaded the Court to say to the Parks — We don’t
have to pay you for your totally-destroyed house until you first borrow the money — 
incur a debt — to buy another one.  And if you just happen to be short of money so you
have to buy a smaller house than you lose, sorry. —   15
The issue was well framed:
Second, Plaintiffs argue it is not a reasonable reading of the
Policy that they are required to “incur” out-of-pocket
expenses in order to collect on their loss. Plaintiffs claim that
the definition of “incurred” should include the incurrence of
repair estimates, like the one Belfor performed.
— CR 1064; Memorandum Decision, p. 11 (4-23-15)
The foregoing did not reflect the interchange between Plaintiffs’ counsel
and the Court during oral argument that the Safeco policy had nothing stating that the
Parks had to incur a debt or new expense in order to collect under the Safeco policy. 
Counsel explained by the example of “if my car is stolen...I have incurred a loss.”  The
Court even agreed that was a reasonable use of the word that would not limit its usage to
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simply incurring new debt:
Mr. Hawkes: Now, in the deposition, Rob Anderson made a
big deal that because they hadn’t gone out and bought
anything, that they hadn’t incurred a loss.
The Court: Right.
Mr. Hawkes: Garbage.
The Court: Why?
Mr. Hawkes: When that house burned to the ground, they
lost it.  There is only one portion of this page 28 that uses the
word “incurred,” and it is not in the last portion that I pointed
out to you.
The Court: Well, it’s listed under 4(b), the direct financial
loss you incurred.
Mr. Hawkes: Yeah, yeah.  Does that mean — does that mean
to the average person that you don’t have any insurance at all
so you go get a loan and build that house?  It obviously
doesn’t mean that.
The Court: Why does it not mean that?  That’s been a debate
that’s been going on in the Idaho courts for decades, as to
whether or not you have to go out and actually replace it
before you get paid.  That’s been a provision in so many
cases.  That discussion has been going on for a very long
time.
Mr. Hawkes: Then you have to — you have to have a
definition of “incur” in this policy that says you have to spend
the money first before we have to pay you a nickel.  And the
policy doesn’t say that.  How else would you describe, if my
car is stolen... 
The Court: Right.
Mr. Hawkes: ...I’ve incurred a loss.  I’ve incurred a loss
when it’s gone.  Isn’t that the plain meaning of the word
“incur”?
The Court: It’s possible, I suppose.  That’s what your
argument is okay.
Mr. Hawkes: I’m saying when I paid a premium for a house
to protect it against a fire, and when that fire burns that to the
ground, I have incurred the loss for which I paid the premium
that they agreed to insure.  The fact that I — the fact that they
want to argue I haven’t incurred a loss because I haven’t then
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in addition to the insurance gone out and borrowed money, I
think is foolish.  And I don’t thing it’s a fair reading.
I don’t think of that being an ambiguity.  I think the
common meaning of the word is an event has happened, I
have incurred a loss.  I now don’t have something that I
did.  It’s gone.  
The Court: Okay.  And what is your loss?
Mr. Hawkes: My loss is what all of agree I had or what I
would get under a replacement policy for what burned down. 
And that’s where Belfour comes in.
The Court: And so your position basically is if I pay a
premium for a Mercedes, I get a Mercedes.  If my Mercedes
gets crushed or stolen, I get a Mercedes no matter what, even
though I replace it with a Chevrolet.
Mr. Hawkes: Yes.  The twist is you don’t get a car if you
paid for a house.
The Court: I know.  The analysis is simple.     
— Hearing Transcript 24:13-26:19 (May 27, 2014)(ea) 
Though it would seem most basic as to any purchase of insurance,
Plaintiffs’ briefing pointed out that, 
“the policy did not require that the Parks ‘incur’ expense to
rebuild before their would have coverage under the Policy.” 
— CR 1038; Plaintiffs’ Reply Memo, p. 1 (2-17-15)
Plaintiffs’ briefing also pointed out that,
There is no requirement that the Parks pay their loss out-of-
pocket before Defendant must pay under the Policy.  Such is
not even “insurance.”  Defendant dismisses this by stating
that whether the Parks were required to “incur” additional
expense is “speculative” because the Plaintiffs never elected
to “rebuild their house.”  — CR 1010, Safeco Opposing
Memo, p. 18 (2-6-15);  CR 1048; Plaintiffs’ Reply Memo, p.
11 (2-17-15)
  Mr. Parks was right.  Both “incur” and “occur” have the same Latin root and are synonyms. 16
Oxford English Dictionary,  www.oed.com/view/Entry/94140 cf www.oed.com/view/Entry/130192.
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In defining “incurred” so as to require a loan, the District Court — again —
erred in selecting, between two reasonable choices, a definition that most favored the
insurer.  The Court applied the law backwards.  Here is how that played out:
The Court chose the 2014 Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “incur” as
“to suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or expense).”  CR 1065; Memorandum Decision,
p. 12 (4-23-15).  And the Court looked no further, even erroneously stating that the
Plaintiffs had not proffered any “conflicting definition” to consider:
In fact, Plaintiff [sic] has not proffered a conflicting
definition of incur, but simply asserted the definition should
include incurred repair estimates.
— CR 1065; Memorandum Decision, p. 12. (4-23-15)
The District Court erred in stating that it was the Plaintiff that did not
proffer a conflicting definition of incur.  It was the Defendant who did not!  See Safeco’s
CR 1010-1011, Safeco Opposing Memo, heading C. “Incurring Additional Expense” pp.
18-19 (2-6-15).
Mr. Parks had testified in his deposition that the word “incurred” to him
meant  — that “it occurs.”   CR 225; David Parks Depo 83:13-15.   16
“Incurred” as used in the Insurance Industry includes the event of “a Loss”
Further, Charles Miller, Plaintiff’s insurance industry expert, had provided
a Declaration setting forth the expert fact information that the word “incurred” in the
insurance industry had a meaning that was synonymous with a loss being incurred and
  Safeco proffered no expert to contest this proffered fact that “incurred” as used within the17
insurance industry included the meaning of incurring a loss.  Mr. Miller’s fact information was not
challenged.  It was, however, totally disregarded by the District Court. 
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the amount of that loss being evidenced by an appraisal or estimate:17
14. Safeco's obligation to the Parks was to pay replacement
cost as limited to what the Parks incurred loss was (or the
insured’s “financial loss”) within a short time following the
loss. The word “incurred” is not defined in the Safeco policy;
pursuant to insurance industry standards for the
interpretation of insurance policies it should be read to
include repair estimates, which have not been paid. Indeed,
that is the only reasonable reading of the incurred
requirement, because it would not likely be possible for the
insured to actually pay the full repair estimate shortly after
the loss; the very purpose of insurance is to avoid that very
thing. Further, defining “incurred” as including a repair
estimate, such as the detailed one performed by Belfor
Property Restoration, is consistent with the Safeco policy
definition of “Replacement cost.”
* * *
15. Most importantly, Safeco did not require that the Parks
incur anything before it paid the original $169,000 amount
based on the Jones appraisal.  Safeco’s argument now
asserting that the Parks were required to “incur” a further
loss  before Safeco was obligated to make full payment turns18
the very purpose of insurance on its head by requiring an
insured to first pay for the very loss sustained and insured
against before receiving payment from the insurer. That is
contrary to the policy, Safeco’s annual representations to the
Parks, Safeco’s conduct here and any insured’s reasonable
expectations in the same circumstances.
— CR 943, Miller Declaration, ¶14 & 15 (ea)
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The Safeco Policy — The “loss you incur”
Further, the Court’s approach to the definition of “incur” ignored the very
use of “incur” in the sense of a loss as contained in the policy itself:
! (d) the direct financial loss you incur; POL 28, ¶5. a.(1)(d)
! (b) the direct financial loss you incur; POL 28, ¶5. a.(4)(b)
—  CR 284; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 28; Safeco Depo. Ex. 2.
Safeco’s position to the District Court
Safeco’s argument in summary judgment briefing was that the Parks were
required to become indebted or spend money on their loss before Safeco had any
obligation to pay under the policy: 
! “Safeco would pay the full amount it cost to replace the dwelling when
the Parks incurred—i.e., paid the cost of such replacement.”  
— CR 179, Safeco Memo Supporting Summary Judgment, p. 7 (4-11-14)
! “Parks would have to actually spend something.”  
— CR 181, Safeco Memo Supporting Summary Judgment, p. 9 (4-11-14)
 
!  Plaintiffs had not spent $440,195.55; “he and his wife had not incurred
$440,195.55 in costs” CR 182, Safeco Memo Supporting Summary
Judgment, p. 10 (4-11-14); 
! “The Parks did not incur any rebuilding costs * * * They never paid
Belfor any amount” CR 182, Safeco Memo Supporting Summary
Judgment, p. 10 (4-11-14);
!  “Plaintiffs had not incurred any amount beyond the price of the Idaho
Falls home” CR 184, Safeco Memo Supporting Summary Judgment, p. 12
(4-11-14); 
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Legal and Insurance use of “incur”
It was error for the District Court, in the process of defining “incur,” to
limit its plain meaning to solely  incurring a debt or expense.  The words incur and
incurred are just as commonly used to describe an injury or damage inflicted upon a
person or their property.  Specifically, what the District Court did was ignore the common
meaning of incurring a loss or injury exactly like what happened to the Parks when their
house burned down.  Because of the “Charlotte fire” the Parks incurred the total loss of
their home.
There is nothing in the Safeco policy — definitions or otherwise — that
says an insured must “incur” additional expense in order to recover for an insured loss. 
Common language usage recognizes that when an insured has damage to their person or
their property they have incurred a loss or an injury.  
“Incurring a loss” is well-recognized in the law
That is exactly what the Idaho Supreme Court defined the term “incurred”
to mean in the context of a worker’s compensation claim and an injury that “is actually
incurred in the employer's employment.”  The Supreme Court noted that an injury may
even be “incurred” before it is even manifest because an event has already taken place. 
Sundquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc., 141 Idaho 450, 455-56, 111 P.3d 135,
140-41 (2005)).
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The use of “incur” in the context of “to incur a loss” is universally common
in insurance law and the law generally.  Both usages are common.  Here are a few:
[The] claimant's injuries residual of his accident gradually
increased in extent and severity, by reason whereof he has
incurred physical impairment in addition to that for which he
had been previously compensated....
— Nitkey v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Min. & Concentrating
Co., 73 Idaho 294, 296, 251 P.2d 216, 217 (1952)
* * *
Morrison’s employer required him to sign an agreement
prepared by the University holding it harmless from any loss
or damage he might incur due to the University’s
negligence....
— Morrison v. Northwest Nazarene University, 152 Idaho
660, 661, 273 P.3d 1253, 1254 (2012) (Justice Eismann)
* * *
Where an injured party takes steps to mitigate the damages
caused by another, she is entitled to the costs she reasonably
incurs in avoiding those damages.— McCormick Intern. USA,
Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920, 923, 277 P.3d 367, 370 (2012)
* * *
Without getting into specific factual situations, it would be
safe to conclude that the implementation of probationers'
‘voluntary’ work programs sponsored by the State, could
probably subject the State to both liability for the negligent
actions of such volunteers, and for liability under common
law theories for any injury that the probationer may incur
while performing acts within the scope of such voluntary
employment.”  
— Idaho Attorney General Opinion 78-17 (3-28-78), 1978 WL 22946
Thus, there was zero basis for the District Court to limit its definition of
“incur” to solely incurring a debt and then leap to the conclusion that the Parks had to
“incur a debt” to get paid for the insured loss of their home.  At a minimum , the policy
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definition of incurring a loss is at least ambiguous.  And the law is clear — because
insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, not subject to negotiation between the
parties, ambiguities must be construed most strongly against the insurer.  Clark v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242 (2003).  The District
Court erred in not so doing.
POINT FOUR
THE COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING
THE POLICY CONTEXT OF THE WORDS 
“AS DETERMINED SHORTLY FOLLOWING THE LOSS”
The errors of the District Court in (1) determining that the cheaper Idaho
Falls home was “the equivalent of” the home the Parks lost, and (2) in ruling that the
words “incur” or “incurred” could only mean that the Parks had to go in debt for another
home before they could collect under their policy was compounded by the District Court
failing to read the policy in its full context.  
The Parks Safeco policy entitled the Parks to be paid “shortly following the
loss.”  Not months later; and not only after they had borrowed the money to cover their
loss.
The Safeco Claims Manual
The Safeco Claims Manual set forth “Safeco Service Principles” of prompt
  That same tail-end modifying clause is in both subdivisions (1) (b) and (c) of the policy. 19
Subdivision (b) refers to “that part” of the damaged building and was not further considered by the Court
as the Parks’ home was totaled.  However, there is no reason “that part” could not also refer to the entire
home being destroyed as it was.  It is important to recognize that subdivisions (b) and (c) are not
counterparts where one is dealing with a partial destruction and the other with a total destruction;
subdivision (b) is dealing with a perspective of “on the same premises” whereas subdivision (c) is not so
modified.   
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payment:
Often the last impression we leave our customers with is the
settlement and payment of the claim — and it is another
moment of truth.  Customers tell us that receiving prompt and
fair payment is very important to them and has a significant
impact in shaping how they view their claims experience and
Safeco.  You should set the proper expectations, explain the
details of the payment and follow up to ensure the customer
received the funds. 
— CR 737; Safeco Depo. Ex. 11, p. 7, Safeco Claims Manual “Claim
Handler Assistance and Resource Tool.”
 
Disregard of context words “as determined shortly following the loss”
Specifically, the District Court totally focused on the Idaho Falls house
purchased five months after the fire and only addressed the first part of the clause in
paragraph (1)(c) while disregarded the context words “as determined shortly following the
loss”  from this portion of the policy:19
(1) We will pay the full cost of repair or replacement, but not
exceeding the smallest of the following amounts:
(a) the limit of liability under the Policy applying
Coverage A or B;
(b) the replacement cost of that part of the damaged
building for equivalent construction and use on the
  See, CR 1060; Memorandum Decision, p. 7 (4-23-15).20
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same premises as determined shortly following the
loss;
(c) the full amount actually and necessarily incurred to
repair or replace the damaged building as determined
shortly following the loss;
(d) the direct financial loss you incur; or
(e) our pro rata share of any loss when divided with
any other valid and collectible insurance applying to
the covered property at the time of loss.20
The significance is that both are modified by the clause “as determined
shortly following the loss” so it is not reasonable to read either of them as involving any
completed new construction or other home purchase. 
The context must be considered
In totally ignoring that “as determined shortly following the loss” clause the
District Court went afoul of the rule that insurance language must be read in the context
in which it appears; the focus cannot be on some words while ignoring the rest:
When deciding whether or not a particular provision is
ambiguous, we must consider the provision within the context
in which it occurs in the policy.  North Pac. Ins. Co. v. Mai,
130 Idaho 251, 939 P.2d 570 (1997)
— Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho 138 Idaho 443, 444, 
65 P.3d 184,185 (2003)
* * *
“Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of
law over which this Court exercises fee review.  When
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deciding whether or not a particular provision is ambiguous,
we must consider the provision within the context in which it
occurs in the policy” Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 138
Idaho 443, 445-46, 65 P.3d 184, 186-87 (2003).
— Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance,
149 Idaho 299, 315, , 233 P.3d 1221, 1237 (2010)
Because “shortly following the loss” is almost always going to be in the
context of the loss investigation and assessment of the extent of the damage and what it
will take to restore what was destroyed, it was not reasonable for the District Court to
interpret subdivision (c) as relating to the less expensive Idaho Falls house that the Parks
bought five months later.  
“Incurred” must be read in conjunction with “shortly following the loss”
Plaintiffs’ expert, Charles Miller, explained the fact that in the insurance
industry the combination of the word “incurred” as to a loss in conjunction with “shortly
following the loss” would relate to repair or reconstruction bids or estimates:
14. Safeco's obligation to the Parks was to pay replacement
cost as limited to what the Parks incurred loss was (or the
insured’s “financial loss”) within a short time following the
loss. The word “incurred” is not defined in the Safeco policy;
pursuant to insurance industry standards for the
interpretation of insurance policies it should be read to
include repair estimates, which have not been paid. Indeed,
that is the only reasonable reading of the incurred
requirement, because it would not likely be possible for the
insured to actually pay the full repair estimate shortly after
the loss; the very purpose of insurance is to avoid that very
thing. Further, defining “incurred” as including a repair
estimate, such as the detailed one performed by Belfor
Property Restoration, is consistent with the Safeco policy
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definition of “Replacement cost.”
— CR 943, Miller Declaration, ¶14 (ea)
In this case the Belfor Property Restoration appraisal determined what the
Parks’ minimum loss was “shortly following the loss.”  It was error for the District Court
to ignore that modifying clause that the Parks were entitled to be paid “shortly following
the loss.”
POINT FIVE
THE CONDUCT OF SAFECO WAS BAD FAITH;
GENUINE QUESTIONS OF BAD FAITH AND ESTOPPEL
PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
At a minimum, even if Safeco’s interpretation was correct, it waived the
very protections it seeks.
“It is elementary that ...provisions in an insurance policy ...
provided by the insurer for its own benefit ... may readily be
waived by the company. And a waiver may be effected by
conduct as well as by agreement.”  Lewis v. Continental Life
& Accident Co., 93 Idaho 348, 354, 461 P.2d 243 (1969).
Therefore, even if Safeco had utilized sufficiently clear policy language,
which is not conceded, it waived by conduct, any requirement that the Parks must incur a
debt before getting reimbursed.
Safeco’s claim is inconsistent with its conduct.  About a month after the
fire, and before the home construction, Safeco voluntarily sent the Parks a check for
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$169,000 with a notation on it  “In Payment of: Cov[erage] A – Dwelling – Market
Value”.  CR 400; David Parks Depo. Ex. 20, p.2 (Check No. 8004530 (7-26-12)).  This
conduct contradicts Safeco’s position and evidences at a minimum a waiver.  And at a
bare minimum, creates a genuine issue of material fact as to what Safeco’s true
interpretation of the policy is.
15. Most importantly, Safeco did not require that the Parks
incur anything before it paid the original $169,000 amount
based on the Jones appraisal. Safeco's argument now
asserting that the Parks were required to “incur” a further loss
before Safeco was obligated to make full payment turns the
very purpose of insurance on its head by requiring an insured
to first pay for the very loss sustained and insured against
before receiving payment from the insurer. That is contrary to
the policy, Safeco’s annual representations to the Parks,
Safeco's conduct here and any insured’s reasonable
expectations in the same circumstances. 
— CR 943; Miller Declaration, p. 7, ¶ 15 (ea)
However, it may also indicate knowing conduct on the part of Safeco to
voluntarily pay a loss, and only later when their appraisal is shown to be facially
deficient, claim that any real reimbursement will come only after the insured has incurred
out-of-pocket loss — which is not expressly required by the policy.  This second potential
scenario raises the specter of bad faith conduct — an intentional denial or withholding of
payment, where the claim was not fairly debatable, and the denial or failure to pay was
not the result of a good faith mistake.  See, Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
137 Idaho 173, 176, 45 P.3d 829 (2002).
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The bottom line is that at a minimum there is a waiver of the very condition
that Safeco seeks to claim in this case.
POINT SIX
THE PARKS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §41-1839(1)
The Parks request this Court’s award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code § 41-1839(1), on the basis that Safeco has not paid the amount justly due. 
Idaho Code § 41-1839(1) states: 
“Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of
insurance, surety, guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature
whatsoever that fails to pay a person entitled thereto within
thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as
provided in such policy, certificate or contract, or to pay to the
person entitled thereto within sixty (60) days if the proof of
loss pertains to uninsured motorist or underinsured motorist
coverage benefits, the amount that person is justly due under
such policy, certificate or contract shall in any action
thereafter commenced against the insurer in any court in this
state , or in any arbitration for recovery under the terms of the
policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount as the
court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action
or arbitration.”  
Idaho Code § 41-1839(1) also applies on appeal.  See Cherry v. Coregis
Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 882, 888, 204 P.3d 522, 528 (2009); Cranney v. Mutual of Enumclaw
Ins. Co., 45 Idaho 6, 9, 175 P.3d 168, 1711 (2007). 
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CONCLUSION
Safeco did not honor its duty with the Parks.  The Parks had been loyal
insureds of Safeco for 18 years.  Each of those 18 years Safeco urged them to increase the
coverage on their home so it was insured for its complete value.  Every year the Parks
accepted Safeco’s valuation and correspondingly paid Safeco the increased premium.  
The homeowners policy Safeco sold the Parks concluded with two pages
that were titled “Ask yourself: Do you have enough insurance coverage?” and “Let’s
make sure you’re fully insured.”  The last two lines of the last page of the Safeco policy
ended with “Of course, we hope you’ll never need these services.  But we’ll all sleep
better knowing you’re fully insured.  Thank you for trusting Safeco with your home
insurance needs.” CR 304-305; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 48-49.  
The Parks did “trust” Safeco.  They trusted Safeco with the annual home
value recommendations of “enough insurance coverage” and they paid the increased
annual premium that went along with those annual recommendations.  The Parks trusted
Safeco to be honorable with them and give them insurance for which they had faithfully
paid the premium for 18 years.  
The “Charlotte fire” of June 28, 2012 that destroyed the Parks’ quality
home and 65 others in Pocatello put the Parks in the position of needing to trust Safeco
to take care of them.  What they got from Safeco was not worthy of trust.  
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What the Parks got from Safeco was a pronouncement that Safeco would
require the Parks to borrow money to get another home before Safeco would pay up! 
Safeco was not providing “insurance” in any sense of the word that allowed the Parks to
“sleep better knowing you’re fully insured” as Safeco promised.  Safeco had the Parks
“over the barrel” and was content to take advantage.
The District Court committed error in taking a pro-Safeco interpretation of
the Parks’ policy that ignored the full terms and context of the policy “”Loss Settlement”
provisions.  Summary judgment in favor of Safeco should be reversed with entry of
Judgment for the Parks for the full insured valuation of the Parks’ home that Safeco had
asserted and accepted and the case remanded for trial against Safeco on bad faith.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23  day of November, 2015rd
__________/s/_________________ _______________/s/________________
LOWELL N. HAWKES RYAN S. LEWIS
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